Can XSS cancel out token based CSRF protection?
If a reflected XSS vulnerability exists anywhere else on the site within a function that is not protected by a CSRF token, then that XSS can be exploited in the normal way. CSRF tokens do not protect against stored XSS vulnerabilities.
What is absence of anti-CSRF tokens?
The absence of Anti-CSRF tokens may lead to a Cross-Site Request Forgery attack that can result in executing a specific application action as another logged in user, e.g. steal their account by changing their email and password or silently adding a new admin user account when executed from the administrator account.
Why are anti CSRF tokens null and void?
Any CSRF protection is null and void given the presence of XSS, for several reasons. The main and obvious reason is that, through XSS, the attacker can hijack the session and spoof the user, not even having to worry about performing CSRF. ASP.NET has the capability to generate anti-CSRF security tokens for consumption by your application, as such:
Is it possible to steal CSRF tokens with XSS?
All the best protections can be undone with a simple mistake. You still need to lure the victim to the page hosting the stored XSS or get them to click on a reflected XSS link in a browser that will allow it to be triggered, but getting users to click links is not usually that hard.
What’s the difference between CSRF and XSS attacks?
When performing an XSS attack, the hacker attempts to execute the malicious code in a victim’s browser by including the malicious script in a legitimate web page. While abusing CSRF vulnerability, the attacker is trying to “become a user”. In an XSS attack, the villain is trying to “become a part of the website”.
Why do cookies protect tokens against XSS attacks?
If Evil Corp can get some JavaScript running in your domain – that’s XSS – then you’re hosed. Cookies are convenient because you don’t have to write JavaScript code to manage the token – only the XSRF. Redirection becomes a little more automatic too, if you want to use it.